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Abstract: International commentators seem to have a consensus view that the Chinese yuan is 
substantially undervalued and the Chinese monetary authority must take speedy actions to 
redress the currency misalignment by rapid nominal revaluation. This paper argues for a 
gradualist but comprehensive strategy for adjusting RMB’s exchange rate. Taking into 
consideration of the facts that the yuan’s undervaluation is caused by an array of domestic and 
international factors and the Chinese central bank cannot effectively invest its growing 
holdings of foreign reserves, we develop a framework to provide a theoretical underpinning 
for the optimal strategy for renminbi’s gradual revaluation. With this strategy, the renminbi 
undervaluation problem is gradually redressed through a combination of nominal appreciation 
and higher inflation plus some other structural and macroeconomic policies. This strategy can 
also allow absorb external imbalances hence strengthening the foundation of China’s long-
term growth. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Since its accession to the WTO in December 2001, China has rapidly increased its 
external trade and has managed to achieve strong economic performance despite the break-out 
of the recent global financial crisis. The ensuing large accumulation of the nation’s foreign 
reserves and its persistent trade surplus have fuelled international pressure for China to 
quickly revalue its currency, the yuan also known as the renminbi (RMB).  
In the United States, the undervaluation of the yuan and its rectification are brought to the 
forefront since exchange-rate adjustment is viewed by many as one of the critically important 
policy tools to revive the U.S. economy, given that American fiscal policy is at verge of 
violating the solvency constraint and the monetary policy hits the zero lower bound (ZLB) on 
the nominal interest rate while the extreme looseness of these policies seems to have 
aggravated erratic movements of the dollar. 
Even though some authors do not believe that a RMB appreciation could fix American 
trade imbalances with China (Tatom 2007), a large group of researchers seem to agree that the 
yuan is undervalued while differing in their views about the degree and origin of the 
undervaluation.
1
 Only a few economists contest that the equilibrium value of the yuan is 
undervalued (Chu 2005; Cheung et al. 2007; Wang et al. 2007; J. Chen 2009) and their 
empirical findings indicate that exchange rate policy per se may have played only a limited 
role in China’s trade surpluses. Wen (2011) suggests that the RMB may depreciate 
substantially if China abandons the exchange rate peg and unleashes the massive 
precautionary savings of Chinese households toward international markets in search of higher 
returns. 
To resorb the yuan’s undervaluation, most discussions in the vast and growing literature 
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on the yuan’s exchange rate policy are concerned with the nominal exchange rate. The debate 
mainly focuses on the speed of revaluation. Liu (2004) and Mundell (2004) defend the status 
quo because currency appreciation would aggravate unemployment and financial fragility. 
Tung and Baker (2004), arguing that revaluation could boost Chinese per capita income and 
purchasing power in dollar terms, discard the potential destabilizing effects of a one-step maxi 
revaluation, while Voon et al. (2006) maintain that the negative impacts of an appreciation of 
the real exchange rate (RER) on exports may be diluted by the positive impacts attributing to 
a reduction in the RER misalignment. Wang (2010) suggests a gradual appreciation of the 
RMB against the dollar at an annual rate of between 6% and 10%. If a one-step maxi 
revaluation is not adopted, macroeconomic policies and regulations and economic reforms 
must be skilfully implemented to ensure external and internal balances (Liu 2004; Dai 2006; 
Woo 2006; Eichengreen
 
and Hatase 2007; Hong et al. 2008; N’Diaye 2010). 
It is well known in open-economy macroeconomics that for the purposes of economic 
adjustment, use of the exchange rate as a policy tool can be performed in two ways, i.e. 
changing the nominal level of the currency or the adjustment in the real economy, hence the 
change of the RER. However, discussions on the RER adjustment are somehow largely 
missing in the current international debate on China’s exchange rate policy.  
This paper argues for a real revaluation route for the renminbi adjustment and has 
prescribed a policy mix for the course of action. In effect, a multitude of international and 
domestic factors has led to real undervaluation of the yuan, implying that the latter cannot be 
dealt only with nominal revaluation. The inability of PBOC to effectively invest its growing 
holdings of foreign reserves has also played a critical role in the yuan’s undervaluation saga. 
Their importance implies that rapid nominal revaluation of the yuan could bring large 
unmanageable disruptions in Chinese economy while a gradual nominal revaluation without 
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being accompanied by other policy adjustments might not resolve the problem. This calls for 
a new strategy for China to revalue the yuan.  
The paper thus aims to contribute to the literature on China’s exchange rate policy by 
providing a theoretical framework justifying an optimal strategy for yuan’s adjustment 
featuring association of yuan’s gradual nominal revaluation with higher inflation to bring the 
RER to its equilibrium level. We propose that the central bank should set, besides inflation 
and output targets, a gradually decreasing target for foreign reserves. To reduce the amplitude 
of revaluation and to avoid potential risks of such a strategy during the transition, we also 
advocates adopting some structural and macroeconomic policies to help rebalance China’s 
internal and external imbalances while laying down the foundation for China’s future growth. 
The approach proposed by this paper highlights a critical aspect of the issue of renminbi 
adjustment, which has been unduly ignored for long. Therefore, this paper enriches policy 
options for unwinding the Chinese currency problem and hence adds to the current debate on 
an important issue of the world economy. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 analyses the factors leading 
to the yuan’s undervaluation. Section 3 argues for its real revaluation through setting a target 
of foreign reserves. Section 4 theoretically shows the optimal combination of monetary and 
exchange rate policies for realising a real revaluation. Section 5 discusses policy measures 
helping achieve the latter. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Factors leading to the yuan’s undervaluation  
 
Before conceiving an optimal strategy for yuan’s adjustment, we review the role played 
by some most important factors in inducing the yuan’s undervaluation, such as low unitary 
labour costs in China, rapid progress in productivity, adhesion to the WTC, domestic fiscal, 
 4 
monetary and exchange rate policies and their foreign counterparts, and foreign direct 
investment (FDI). These factors, directly and indirectly related to the balance of payments, 
contribute to the one-directional and accelerating accumulation of Chinese foreign reserves 
beginning in 1994 (Figure 1), which constitutes the appropriate measure for the yuan’s 
undervaluation.  
The balance of payments under an exchange rate peg is described by:  
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where (...)Z  and (.)H  represent exports and imports, respectively, 
h
tP  the price of home 
goods, tY  the output, tT  the taxes, ti  the nominal interest rate, tE  the nominal exchange rate, 
tB  trade barriers, and tX  stands for foreign reserves. (...)F  represents capital flows including 
FDI which positively reacts to the output (i.e. market size) and the ratio of foreign wage ( *tW ) 
to domestic wage ( tW ). Corresponding foreign variables are marked with an asterisk. 
Figure 1. Exchange rate of the RMB, foreign reserves, FDI and trade balance of China. 
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Consider now these factors in historical and economic perspective. When China opened 
its door to international trade and FDI in the early 1980s to modernize its economy, it was an 
insignificant player in international goods and financial markets. The average Chinese wage 
was only about 95.67 yuans (or USD 32.58) in 1985 per month while it was 2687 yuans in 
2009 (USD 393.35).
2
 Despite a very low labour cost, China often experienced trade deficits 
until 1993 because it did not supply goods needed by other countries. Thus, a low labour cost 
in itself is not sufficient for ensuring trade surpluses and accumulation of foreign reserves. 
The key to understanding Chinese structural trade surpluses since mid-1990s is that China 
has become increasingly competitive through a combination of disinflation, currency 
devaluations, FDI-friendly policy, wage moderation, and favourable international 
environment (i.e., adhesion to the WTO and very accommodative macroeconomic policies in 
developed countries since the early 2000s). 
Following high inflation rates during 1988-1989 and 1993-1994, triggered by the price 
liberalization and a loose monetary policy, the yuan had to be devaluated by 33.16% against 
the dollar in August 1994 despite its gradual devaluation since 1980. Between August 1994 
and July 2005, China adopted a monetary regime of exchange-rate targeting, which was 
named a managed float but was a de facto peg at around 8.28 yuan/USD, as a nominal anchor 
against high inflation.
3
 It allowed successfully slow down Chinese inflation. 
During the 1997 Asian crisis, many international commentators considered that the yuan 
was overvalued and predicted its large devaluation because the South-east Asian economies 
have sharply devalued their currencies. China maintained the yuan’s peg to avoid competitive 
devaluations, keeping its neighbours from an even more catastrophic financial and economic 
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downturn. Instead, China sought to placate exporters by offering a 17% value-added export 
tax rebate, i.e., a disguised devaluation of the yuan. 
These policies, while keeping China competitive, would not generate large balance-of-
payments surpluses if not for the FDI-friendly policy. The FDI in China began to rapidly 
increase from 1992 due to three factors: the passage of a very favourable fiscal law in 1991, 
the reaffirmation of China’s determination to open the economy, and the yuan’s aggressive 
devaluation in 1994. Besides the capital inflows it brought, the FDI has especially contributed 
to the accumulation of foreign reserves through its stimulant effects on exportation by greatly 
increasing the labour productivity and the production of high quality goods desired by 
Western consumers (Whalley and Xin 2010; Ceglowski and Golub 2011). These effects have 
been largely amplified by the elimination of trade barriers after China’s accession to the WTO 
and accommodative macroeconomic policies in developed countries. The resulting massive 
increase in foreign reserves since 2001 has revealed the hidden real undervaluation of the 
yuan against major currencies. 
The combination of these factors has produced snowballing effects on the accumulation of 
foreign reserves because Chinese policymakers did not adjust their policy to the new 
economic environment due the hysteresis in their attitude vis-à-vis the role of the USD. 
 After its economic opening, China was faced with a period of dollar shortage. This 
experience and financial turmoil experienced by some emerging countries due to dollar 
shortage have convinced China to accumulate dollars at all costs (Corden 2009). 
The period of dollar shortage ended with the implementation of extremely loose US 
monetary policy, i.e. very low interest rates for a prolonged period, to stimulate the economy 
after the burst of the Internet bubble in 2000. The easy access to cheap credit by American 
businesses and households has resulted in exceptional growth of the global dollar supply. The 
supplementary dollars held by foreign central banks returned to American financial markets 
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with the effects of plunging the median- and long-term interest rates, further stimulating credit 
activities. This policy created a large bubble in the property market, which has excessively 
stimulated the U.S. consumption through the virtual wealth effect. In 2005-2007, annual U.S. 
trade deficits represented about 6% of U.S. GDP, indicating a large excess of money supply 
and a lack of savings. 
In this new environment, Chinese exchange rate policy was not anymore appropriate. In 
the mid-2000s, China was under intense pressure from the USA, Japan and the EU to revalue 
the yuan and to introduce a more flexible exchange rate regime. The yuan’s undervaluation 
against the dollar was then estimated in a range of 18 to 60% (Zhang and Pan 2004; Coudert 
and Couharde 2007). China undertook a 22% nominal revaluation of the yuan against the 
dollar from July 2005 to July 2008, while shifting from the dollar peg to a peg to a basket of 
currencies, with a fluctuation range of ±0.3% per day. With the onset of the global financial 
crisis, the PBOC kept the yuan at about 6.83 per dollar after July 2008, as part of the stimulus 
package to help China weather the global recession. 
Yet, at the time, the yuan’s revaluation was incomplete. In fact, the yuan’s undervaluation 
to some extent was reinforced over time by the continuous depreciation of the RMB’s RER 
induced by, among other things, the capability of foreign and domestic firms in China to 
produce and export more goods of higher values at low costs. Hence, previous revaluation of 
the yuan had no significant negative effects on the U.S. imports from China, contrary to the 
prediction by some empirical studies (Thorbecke and Smith 2010). There was therefore a one-
way-bet in the Chinese foreign exchanges market, attracting not only inflows of hot money 
but also inhibiting private capital outflows from counterbalancing China’s large trade surplus 
(McKinnon and Schnabl 2009). This resulted into rapid build-up of foreign reserves, gradual 
but consistent erosion of monetary controls and hence the instability of the yuan’s peg (Ma 
and Sun 2007). These developments in turn led to the rising pressure on the yuan to further 
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revalue and the need for a more flexible exchange rate regime (Liu and Zhang 2009). In this 
context, the PBOC announced in June 2010 new reform of the renminbi exchange rate policy, 
which launched again the yuan’s nominal revaluation. 
However, nominal revaluation might not easily resorb the yuan’s undervaluation given 
the dynamic nature of the issue, the complexity of interactions between multiple factors, and 
inadequate domestic and foreign policy choices. The above analysis justifies our proposal for 
a real revaluation strategy and some prescriptions for China’s exchange rate policy in 
following sections. 
 
3. Real revaluation of the yuan through having an objective of foreign reserves  
 
The previous analysis shows that the causes of the yuan’s undervaluation are multiple and 
implies that there might be different policy options to resolve the problem. This section 
revisits some arguments according to which China’s current external disequilibrium is 
manageable, and argues that foreign reserves must be regarded as an objective in a real 
revaluation strategy, under which monetary and exchange rate policies are optimally 
determined. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, China had an explicit objective of stabilizing its exchange rate. 
This actually became an implicit objective of accumulating as much foreign currencies as 
possible, leading to the adoption of policies limiting the access of private agents to foreign 
currencies, restricting imports, stimulating exports and attracting the FDI. This implicit 
objective and corresponding policy choices, not revised in time, played a great role in the 
explosive accumulation of foreign reserves. 
China’s current reserves ($3240.01 billions in June 2012) have far exceeded the optimal 
level corresponding to its objective of exchange rate stabilisation. Four main policy options 
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are available for China to rectify this situation: spending and investing them, diversifying 
them through appropriate management of portfolios while avoiding unnecessary risks, gradual 
liberalization of the capital account, and a switch in their holders (Zheng and Yi 2007).  
However, none of these options provides a viable and definitive solution for Chinese 
external disequilibrium. Moreover, given the current global environment, it is a great 
challenge for the PBOC and Chinese sovereign fund managers to preserve and increase the 
value of Chinese official holdings of foreign reserves in terms of purchasing power because 
international investment opportunities are limited and management of the risk involved may 
prove to be a very challenging task.  
First, in many industrialized countries, governments are faced with an increasingly 
difficult mission to control public debt within a sustainable level because politicians would be 
overwhelmed by the need to attract votes at the expense of future generations due to the 
quasi-absence of intergenerational altruism in the public sphere. There is growing eventuality 
that public finance may collapse and hence needs unchecked money creation. 
Second, Anglo-Saxon hedge funds and speculators have been quick in their response to  
the new context. One prominent development in this regard is their extensive activities in 
international commodity markets, to hedge against inflation and to heap speculative profits. 
The erratic price movements on these markets make them a very risky place for sovereign 
investment, especially those newcomers to the markets.  
Third, Chinese outward FDI is often not attainable because of various constraints. 
Investments in well-established international firms could be obstructed for political or 
regulatory reasons. One conspicuous example is the unsuccessful takeover case of Conoco 
Phillips by China National Offshore Oil. The U.S. Congress finally blocked the deal on the 
ground of national security. Investment in foreign financial institutions as proposed by Q. 
Chen (2009), who urges the PBOC to invest its reserves in major US banks, is probably 
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equally unworkable. Outward FDI in developing countries with rich endowment of raw 
materials also proves problematic. For one thing, in these countries domestic stability is often 
disrupted by internal conflicts or external interferences. Nationalist feelings in these countries 
often run high, leading to labelling Chinese investment as neo-colonialist hence create a 
negative environment for the Chinese business. It is unlikely that China can invest a 
substantial portion of its reserves in there. China must therefore not be overambitious in 
deploying foreign investments as an effective way to absorb its growing foreign reserves.  
Moreover, if the yuan is not or insufficiently revaluated and given the industrial and 
macroeconomic policies pursued by China and its trading partners, China will continuously 
increase its foreign reserves. Despite recent large wage rises, China’s unit labour costs remain 
very low compared to these in Western countries. In the long term, Chinese workers will 
likely be trained to perform as productively as their Western counterparts. Hence, 
competitiveness will play in favour of China over a long period: as long as the cumulative 
increase in productivity exceeds the cumulative wage rise, and foreign and domestic firms 
improve the quality and the scope of goods produced for export, China will continue to 
experience trade surpluses with the RER depreciating over time. Furthermore, strong growth 
in China will attract not only FDI but also hot money, further accentuating the problem.  
The accumulation of foreign reserves is desirable to the extent that it may facilitate 
governments’ macro-prudential policy including maintaining stability of the nominal 
exchange rate. Beyond a certain level however, its utility would diminish or even become 
negative because “too much of a good thing”, i.e. the excessive reserves, would incur 
considerable social costs. Even for a normal level of reserves, the cost of carrying the reserves 
could be high as well. The real returns on these reserves would often be negative since the 
rate of real return may become less than the rate of real appreciation of the domestic currency. 
In addition, inflation may erode the purchasing power of the foreign assets. Thus, it is flawed 
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for Chinese policymakers to harbour the illusion that it is a good thing to increase the sheer 
number of foreign governments’ treasuries on their computers. 
Inaction (and delayed action) allows China to temporarily have some competitive 
advantages with the drawback that low wages in dollar terms encourage firms to uphold the 
standard below the international level in capital investment and R&D, preventing China from 
acquiring strategic positions in high-tech and service industries. Growth gained through lower 
labour costs could later be offset by the inevitable revaluation of the yuan. Indeed, the longer 
China waits, the more the adjustment will be painful hence more difficult to conduct, with 
rising costs for China and the world economy as well. Revaluation of the renminbi thus is 
desirable and imperative. 
China must now revalue its currency in a way which avoids large economic disruptions. 
To accomplish this, what Chinese policymakers should consider is real rather than nominal 
revaluation of the yuan. International experiences show that the yuan’s real appreciation, well 
managed, would not damage Chinese development but would, on the contrary, contribute to 
restructuring the Chinese economy towards a domestic demand-based growth track while 
helping ensure domestic financial market stability, mitigate overheating of the economy and 
soaring inflation, and boost job creation in the service sector (Oberpriller et al. 2008; Xu 
2009).  
The current literature provided little guidance about how to realise real revaluation and at 
what rhythm. While real appreciation via nominal appreciation is common among low 
inflation OECD economies, a far more frequent occurrence is real appreciation via faster 
wage rise and inflation for economies that took off from a very low level of per-capita income 
(Xu 2009). For China, there are thus three options for redressing the yuan’s undervaluation: 1) 
rapid nominal revaluation; 2) “uncompetitive inflation”; 3) intermediate option.  
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Huang (2010) advances that rapid nominal yuan revaluation could be better than the price 
adjustment because the latter requires a long period for its effect to rebalance the trade 
position and induce adjustment of output and inflation. However, several important factors 
could work in favour of price adjustment. First, Chinese wages and prices are quite flexible on 
the upside, implying that the costs due to price adjustment may not be too high. Second, 
nominal revaluation provides huge capital gains to market operators holding yuan-
denominated assets but induces high adjustment costs for businesses. Third, rapid nominal 
revaluation of the yuan could induce a large devaluation of the dollar with the risk of 
seriously undermining macroeconomic stability of the world economy (McKinnon and 
Schnabl 2006). Finally, empirical evidence shows that, while the domestic economy could 
pick up some of the external slack due to a large exchange-rate revaluation, the prospect of 
sharp decelerations in export growth will remain a concern for policymakers and warrants 
careful attention especially in developing countries (Kappler et al. 2011) because it could 
induce a massive destruction of firms and jobs, leading to loss of competences, less FDI and 
slower progress in labour productivity, and hence lower long-term growth potential. We could 
not exclude these very undesirable short- and long-term effects on the Chinese economy when 
referring to Japanese experiences. Following the Plaza accord imposing rapid yen 
appreciation, Japan has experienced a short-term recession followed by a speculative boom 
and finally a lost decade (Hamada and Okada 2009). 
No evidence shows that “uncompetitive inflation” has been deliberately conceived as a 
policy option. Its inverse, i.e. “competitive disinflation”, was experienced with some success 
by France under fixed nominal exchange rate (Blanchard and Muet 1993; Fitoussi et al. 
1993). Germany replicated this strategy to gain competitiveness after having joined the 
eurozone (Creel and Le Cacheux 2006). The success of such a strategy is based on the 
capacity of an economy to make internal adjustments in terms of wages, prices and production 
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combined with restrictive monetary and fiscal policies to make the strategy credible. One 
limit to the competitive disinflation is therefore that it could lead to temporary higher 
unemployment if it takes time to be entirely credible or when nominal wages are rigid. In the 
case of “uncompetitive inflation”, such a limit will be transformed into an advantage (higher 
employment) even though the latter is not expected to be important because wages in China 
are upwardly flexible. However, “uncompetitive inflation” must not be solely used to achieve 
the yuan’s real revaluation since it implies too high inflation. 
The Chinese government seems agree that, in a long-term perspective, China as a large 
economy should adopt a flexible exchange rate regime. During the transition to this regime, 
the intermediate option should be adopted.  
Under this option, China could choose to arbitrarily fix the rhythm of nominal 
revaluation. This choice is not recommendable for two reasons. First, concerns for not 
creating economic and social disruptions could make Chinese policymakers reluctant to 
decide a sufficiently large nominal revaluation and hence misses to attain the key objective of 
restoring the external equilibrium and stabilising the domestic economy. Second, China will 
be under the pressures of foreign governments to revalue the yuan with the timing and 
amplitude of revaluation interfered by foreign political agendas (Liu and Pauwels, 2012), and 
hence not necessarily optimal from the Chinese point of view. 
Under the intermediate option, I advocate that China adopts a strategy which 
simultaneously takes into account inflation and output stabilization and the restoration of the 
external equilibrium. Since the best indicator of external disequilibrium is the level of foreign 
reserves and their excessive level induces welfare losses, the government’s loss function 
should include their deviations from the target. The latter should be fixed to avoid economic 
disruptions, implying that China should first reduce the rhythm of accumulation and then the 
level of foreign reserves. 
 14 
In the next section, we study how the policymaker could optimally combine two 
instruments, i.e. domestic credit and nominal exchange rate, to attain his internal and external 
objectives. Then, section 5 discusses, how other policies can support this strategy. 
 
4. An optimal combination of policies for real revaluation 
 
We now examine, using a theoretical model, how China can optimally combine gradual 
nominal revaluation and “uncompetitive inflation” to redress the yuan’s real undervaluation.  
The model has four equations similar to these of Blanchard and Muet (1993) and Fitoussi 
et al. (1993). We add the LM and balance-of-payments equations while modifying the IS 
equation as follows:  
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where all variables except ti  and t  are in log. The lower case variables correspond to the 
logarithm of the upper case variables defined previously. tp  is the domestic price level, 
ny  
the potential output, 1 ttt pp  the inflation rate, tm  the money supply, th  the domestic 
component of money supply (i.e., domestic credit). tltdtptw ,,,,  , , ,   and tf ,  represent 
exogenous shocks affecting the labour market, the production, the goods demand, the money 
market and the foreign exchange market, respectively. We assume rational expectations with 
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t  representing expectation operator. 
Equation (2) describes how the nominal wage adjusts with the expected price level and 
the output gap. Equation (3) shows that the consumer price is the weighted average of the 
prices of domestic and foreign goods. Equation (4) gives the price of domestic goods as a 
weighted average of the wage and the price of foreign goods. Equations (5) and (6) are the 
equilibrium condition in goods and money markets, respectively. Equation (7) is a linear form 
of (1) with some variables neglected for simplicity.  
The Chinese government stabilizes inflation and output around their respective targets. To 
realize the yuan’s real revaluation, it must fix an inflation target Tt  (implying 
T
tt
T
t pp  1 ) higher than the foreign inflation but lower than what is tolerable for the 
population. This avoids the accumulation of inflationary pressures, induced by foreign 
quantitative easing policies, to result in a stronger pressure for revaluing the yuan. Moreover, 
it smoothly reduces foreign reserves by fixing a target Tt  in each period. The government 
minimizes the loss function: 
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where   is the discount factor, 1  and 2  the weights assigned to output and inflation 
stabilization, respectively.  
Minimizing (8) subject to (2)-(7) leads to following optimal targeting rules:  
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optimal trade-off between price level, output and foreign reserves stabilisation. 
To implement rules (9)-(10), optimal policy rules are determined using them and 
equations (5)-(7) as: 
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The policy rules (11)-(12) imply the simultaneous utilization of monetary (“uncompetitive 
inflation”) and exchange rate policies to eliminate the yuan’s undervaluation while stabilizing 
the economy. The real domestic credit depends on the current nominal exchange rate 
optimally set by the government, while the optimal exchange rate in each period depends on 
how the monetary policy is conducted. The domestic credit affects the exchange rate through 
its impacts on the price level, nominal interest rate, and output and hence the actual level of 
foreign reserves. The rule (12) implies a gradual revaluation of the yuan since the deviation of 
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its exchange rate from the equilibrium takes many periods to be totally absorbed along with 
the planned reduction of foreign reserves.  
According to the rule (11), domestic credit increases with the price level target, the 
expected current price and the potential output, and decreases with foreign price level. In the 
absence of trade-off between the price level and foreign reserves, domestic credit should 
decrease if the current price exceeds the target level. We admit that this effect is still dominant 
even though the new trade-off induces some contrary effects (i.e. 01 c  and 02 c ). Higher 
expected future inflation or its positive deviations from the target imply a decrease in real 
domestic credit. Higher foreign reserves in terms of the yuan will reduce the need for 
increasing the domestic credit to satisfy the liquidity demand. The domestic credit should be 
increased to accommodate positive shocks affecting money demand ( tl , ), wage ( tw, ) and 
aggregate demand ( td , ), but has to be decreased in response to a cost shock ( tp, ). 
The rule (12) implies that the nominal exchange rate should be revaluated in response to a 
lower target of foreign reserves, a positive deviation of domestic price from its target 
(implying a negative deviation of the output from its target), an expected future revaluation of 
domestic currency (i.e., lower 1 tte ), an increase in foreign reserves in the past period, and 
an increase in foreign price level relative to domestic one. A positive deviation of expected 
future inflation from its target implies a positive deviation of current foreign reserves from its 
target according to (10) and hence less pressures for revaluation. Higher foreign interest rate 
reduces capital inflows but increases the revenue on existing reserves, and it reduces the 
pressure for revaluation if the first effect dominates the second one. A positive change in 
some factors reduce revaluation pressures through reducing the nominal interest rate, inducing 
thus more imports and less capital inflows. An increase in domestic potential output reduces 
the nominal interest rate by reducing inflation pressures while wage and cost-push shocks 
achieve this by inducing lower output and hence money demand. In the opposite, higher 
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expected inflation implies a higher domestic nominal interest rate as the initial reduction of 
the real interest rate leads to higher aggregate demand, and hence higher output and money 
demand. A positive demand shock (i.e., it directly increases the aggregate demand) works 
through a similar but shorter transmission mechanism, while a positive balance-of-payments 
shock simply adds pressures for revaluation.  
The equilibrium has a unique non-explosive rational expectations solution. Known as the 
“minimal state variable” (MSV) solution, it is obtained using the method of undetermined 
coefficients (McCallum, 1983) but not presented here for its cumbersomeness.
4
  
The real revaluation strategy underlying policy rules (9)-(10) or instrument rules (11)-(12) 
combines the optimal conduct of the monetary policy with gradual adjustment of nominal 
exchange rate in the process of achieving the yuan’s real appreciation. This strategy implies 
that foreign reserves could be increased in the short-run if their decrease or stability implies a 
too rapid nominal revaluation and hence too high adjustment costs for productive sectors. In 
the medium term, as the RER approaches its equilibrium level, the reduction of foreign 
reserves will be put on the government’s agenda. Compared to rapid nominal revaluation, the 
real revaluation strategy has the disadvantage of generating higher inflation during some 
periods. However, the new strategy will avoid the possible costs due to irreversible and 
massive destruction of firms induced by rapid nominal revaluation. Furthermore, the latter 
could induce asset prices bubbles with very undesirable economic consequences as showed 
the Japanese experiences (Hamada and Okada, 2009).  
 
5. Polices supporting the real revaluation strategy 
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Policy rules (11)-(12) imply that structural and macroeconomic policies affect the optimal 
combination of monetary and exchange rate policies through policy components of exogenous 
shocks and structural parameters. Under multiplicative uncertainty, the use of complementary 
policies to support the real revaluation strategy could reduce overall adjustment costs because 
each policy instrument is less intensively used, reducing hence the systemic risk for the 
economy (Brainard 1967).  
Faced with important uncertainty about the transmission mechanism of economic policies 
besides a major external disequilibrium to be eliminated without incurring large costs, 
Chinese policymakers should follow the “Brainard’s conservatism principle” by diversifying 
policy instruments and by being cautious about their utilization.  
In support of the real revaluation strategy, structural and macroeconomic policies should 
be designed to: 1) reduce the overall amplitude of nominal revaluation, 2) alleviate the 
downward pressures put on domestic growth by a real revaluation, or/and 3) counterbalance 
the undesirable consequences of nominal revaluation and higher inflation. In conceiving such 
policies, the government should carefully consider China’s trade structure, financial fragility 
and macroeconomic imbalances. Henceforth, I will selectively discuss some of these 
measures and propose some new ones.
5
 
To redress external imbalances with the aim of reducing the need of revaluation, China 
could reduce distortionary subsidies and tax rebates for exports, cut tariffs and restrictions on 
imports, increase taxation on capital gains realised by foreign corporations and financial 
institutions while restricting short-term capital movements. The government should gradually 
remove excessive fiscal incentives granted to FDI-funded firms while reducing incentives for 
local officials in attracting foreign investors by severing the linkage between the FDI amounts 
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2004; Dai 2006; Woo 2006; Eichengreen
 
and Hatase 2007; Hong et al. 2008; N’Diaye 2010). 
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they attracted and political promotion. Stricter environmental requirements could be applied 
to stop polluter production lines moving to China. 
An income policy, which allows the wage to grow more rapidly, could reduce the yuan’s 
real undervaluation and hence structural trade surpluses. Until recently, the wage growth has 
been behind the growth in productivity while foreign investors and consumers are able to 
enjoy de facto favourable treatment.  
Excessive foreign reserves have, as counterpart, abundant domestic savings. To absorb the 
latter, the government should strive to create more domestic savings instruments by increasing 
good-quality financial assets through, e.g., selling more shares of public enterprises at fair 
prices, debt issuance by firms and creation of venture capital funds. The authority should 
gradually relax its control on the foreign exchange settlement system, allow the private sector 
to hold foreign currencies, and encourage foreign assets to be denominated in RMB through 
accommodative policies allowing for example RMB funds raised offshore to invest in 
mainland Chinese markets (Zheng and Yi 2007; Zhu 2010). 
In the short run, the loss of competitiveness due to nominal revaluations and wage rises 
could induce high unemployment due to weaker growth, and severe financial and economic 
disruptions, and hence could put the Chinese government under great political pressures. 
Adjustment of the income policy might have limited negative effects on growth because FDI-
funded firms will stay in China for production destined to export if the wage growth does not 
exceed that of productivity. Besides, higher purchasing power due to real revaluation and 
wage rise means higher domestic demand, hence a bigger domestic market for foreign firms. 
Rising wages will likely price out firms that create lower value addition but incite innovative 
ones to migrate to produce for higher value addition through introducing new products, new 
production processes and new distribution techniques. This is a process that will not be easily 
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jumpstarted if wages stay very low and will be subject to disruptions caused by sudden and 
large revaluations that may lead to many firms failing simultaneously. 
To alleviate the negative pressures put on domestic growth by a real revaluation, the 
government could employ some policy measures in accordance with the objectives set 
recently, which aim at shifting from the export-led development strategy to a growth strategy 
based on domestic demand.
6
 These measures could include expansionary fiscal policy with a 
focus on education and infrastructure investment, a package of policies to stimulate domestic 
consumption (including higher expenditures on health care, social safety nets and poverty 
reduction, income policies to reduce inequality and to increase wage), the establishment of an 
efficient financial intermediation mechanism with good regulations and supervision, and 
reforms destined to level the playing field between the tradable and the non-tradable sector 
and to further open up the economy to foreign competition. 
More precisely, public expenditures destined to improve supply conditions in the long 
term should be implemented and they could be partly financed by the purchase of government 
bonds by the PBOC. The government can modulate their levels to avoid a slump in growth 
during the real revaluation process. Additional funds should be mobilised to: 1) improve 
superior and professional education, develop basic research and stimulate R&S in Chinese 
firms, helping hence build the foundation of a knowledge economy and enable China to 
narrow the technology gap with industrialised countries; 2) improve the infrastructure by 
realising numerous projects (airports, bridges, high-speed railways, highways, ports, subways, 
etc.) notably in underdeveloped areas, and small and medium cities; 3) modernize agriculture 
to improve the capacity of coping with high inflationary pressures in food prices and the 
likely shortage of other agricultural products. This is to be achieved with particular emphases 
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on providing more funding to farmers, developing farmer-training centres and financing more 
public and private food research. 
Some measures could be put in place to reassure Chinese consumers, to encourage them to 
spend more or to stimulate their consumption needs. A sound social security system for a 
large part of the population could be established to reduce excessive precautionary savings. 
To mitigate high educational costs for Chinese families induced by previous educational 
reforms, more financial support to low-income households should be introduced to help the 
young generation to fulfil its inspiration for knowledge, hence promote long-term growth. 
An important measure to take is to end the one-child policy for urban dwellers. This 
policy has helped accelerate China’s growth since the 1980s by generating more savings but 
makes little sense today as China exports capital. It creates problems linked to an aging 
population (retirement funding, healthcare etc.), not to mention the difficulties faced by every 
young couple to take care of four aging parents. These concerns lead households to save 
more. Its reform can immediately deliver more spending for consumption.  
Managing macroeconomic and social risks that may accompany nominal revaluation and 
higher inflation should be an integral part of the real revaluation strategy and must be high on 
government’s agenda. Nominal revaluation and higher inflation might bring with them some 
undesirable consequences. Often, a not too high inflation could hide excessive increases in the 
prices of basic goods, and the process of nominal revaluation could fuel housing price 
bubbles. Both consequences are particularly detrimental to low-revenue households. The focal 
points of policy concerns are the following : 1) Stabilising food prices since they are 
especially important to low-income families in China. 2) Cooling down the property market to 
prevent speculations from generating a full-fledged economic and financial crisis. The 
consequences of bubble bursting in China’s property market could be grave and have global 
repercussions (Ueda 2010). 
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These measures and others not discussed here, in complement to the real revaluation 
strategy considered in section 4, will gradually reduce the yuan’s undervaluation, and internal 
and external imbalances while mitigating its negative effects on China’s growth by increasing 
domestic demand, wages and inflation, and by reducing net exports and net capital inflows. 
The Chinese government should give full consideration to these policies and apply them with 
diligence in the new international context. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The international debate on the desirability and necessity of the yuan’s revaluation has 
becoming increasingly important in recent years. This paper contributes to this debate by 
proposing a comprehensive strategy that puts complementary policies together to achieve real 
revaluation of the yuan given that the latter’s undervaluation is a result of an array of 
domestic and international factors. We argue that a gradualist approach to the yuan’s real 
revaluation is preferable to hurried nominal revaluation of the yuan against other major 
currencies because the latter has large disruptive effects on the nation’s growth, especially in 
the short run. The accumulation of foreign reserves, originally intended to ensure the stability 
of nominal exchange rate, is no longer beneficial for China because excessive reserves incur 
substantial social cost. Refusal to timely revalue the yuan implies costlier adjustment in the 
future for China and the world economy, while a well-managed process of the yuan’s 
revaluation will prove to be welfare improving without compromising China’s growth.  
Using a theoretical framework, the paper has also shown how to conduct an optimal 
strategy combining gradual nominal revaluation with higher inflation to achieve the yuan’s 
real revaluation and to rebalance China’s external position through setting a target for foreign 
reserves. To reduce the adjustment costs, structural and macroeconomic policies should be 
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designed to decrease the amplitude of nominal revaluation (higher wages, and new fiscal and 
regulatory rules aiming at reducing net exports and net capital inflows); to alleviate the 
downward pressures put on domestic growth (more public expenditures on infrastructure, 
additional funds for national education and R&D, and reforming the social security and the 
one-child policy); and to offset the undesirable consequences of this strategy (food and 
housing policies).  
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